Games in partition function form with restricted cooperation : Students' scienti�c conference paper

Absztrakt (kivonat)

In this paper we consider coalition formation in the presence of externalities and restricted cooperation. Previous papers in the literature define various solution concepts for games in partition function form (PFF), see Myerson (1977b), Bloch (1996) and Kóczy (2007, 2009) among others. However, up to best of our knowledge there is no paper about PFF games with restricted cooperation. The case of restricted cooperation is the one when some coalitions cannot be formed. There are numerous examples for restricted cooperation in politics, economic theory and industrial organizations. In this paper we introduce the notion of PFF games with restricted cooperation, and the concept of the recursive core (Kóczy, 2007) of PFF games with restricted cooperation, and discuss its properties. We also provide an example for a possible empirical application of our model