The Failure of Nuclear Bargaining: the case of India and Pakistan

Abstract

This paper shall argue that information asymmetries and incentives to misrepresent lead to non-credible threats, which, in turn result in inadequate butterfor-bomb offers that drive states to engage in nuclear proliferation. The analysis will be conducted through a neorealist lens, using James D. Fearon’s bargaining model of war, and William Spaniel’s butter-for-bombs theory as a basis. Furthermore, the author will employ game-theoretical models to show why proliferation, or nonproliferation may appear cost-beneficial. The main focus of the paper will be the case of India and Pakistan, and why these two states decided against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author will conduct a qualitative analysis of the negotiating parties’ signals during the period of 1965-1968, and conclude that it was the lack of credible threats that drove both states to opt out of the treaty.