Patron of Cuba: maximizing security or welfare?

Absztrakt (kivonat)

In my paper for the Student Scientific Conference I investigate a postcommunist country, Cuba and its patron-client relationship with the U.S. and China. The aim of my essay was to predict the most plausible outcome for Cuba’s decision makers, as the Venezuelan economic collapse highlighted the country’s vulnerability. As a result it started negotiations with the superpowers. I examine this through my hypothesis: “Cuba perceives greater threat from the US than China, so it has changed from balancing to bandwagoning and ally with the first one.” In the beginning of my essay I provide a macro-level theoretical framework, which is focusing on welfare enhancement: the balance of interest. Then, I give a classification about the types of dictatorships, which determines the state’s micro-level considerations. After, I interpret China’s and the United States’ interest structures, with special respect of the effect caused by a shift in the administration of the latter. I will analyze the Cuban elite’s gains and threats through bridging the two models. At the end I am going to reject my hypothesis, and summarize with one sentence: “Cuba chooses China as a patron to balance against the US based on the elite’s political and economic considerations.”